Der. Doc. #1551
THE U.S. EMBASSY'S RETORT ON THE CHANGKUFING INCIDENT, AUGUST 9, 1938.

FROM Loscovi

Dated August 9, 1938 Rec'd 1:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

August 9, 3 p.m.

My telegram

August 6, 11 e.m.

I understand that the Japanese Ambassador is manifesting creater ressimism following his last conversation with Litvinov and professes to be unable to understand Litvinov's attitude toward the Japanese proposal for cessation of hostilities in view of the fact that Litvinov stated that there were no Japanese troops at that time on Soviet territory and consequently the Soviet insistence on the removal of Japanese troops from territory claimed as Soviet as a condition precedent to any agreement had on the basis of this admission been mett. I understand further that the Ambassador states that the communique of the interview while substantially correct failed to mention that the Japanese Ambassador had refused to accept Litvinov's version that Japanese troops had attached on August 5 and that Japanese forces had provoked the incident at Crodekovo and had said that in both instances Soviet troops had taken the initiative. It is furthermore reported that the Japanese Ambassador admitted yesterday that the Russian troops were believed to be in occurancy of some part but not all of the height Changhufeng.

The declaration, as sublished in the communique of August 8 to the effect that Litvinov after stating that no Jamenese troops were on Soviet territory did not meet the Jamenese proposal for an immediate cessation of hostilities, had given rise to speculation in foreign circles as to the possible motives actuating this stand. The following opinions have been suggested possible explanations: (1) That Litvinov's statement and the military communique were not in accordance with the facts and that Jamenese troops were still in occupancy of what the Soviet Government donsiders to be Soviet territory; (2) that as fighting was presumably still continuing Litvinov envisaged the possibility that before the cessation of hostilities could be actually effected the military situation might alter in favor of the Jamenese and that contrary to his previous stand he would then be in the position of having agreed to a cessation of hostilities while Jamenese troops were actually in occupation of Soviet territory, or (3) that the Soviet Government or Litvinov in the hope of exacting further concessions from the Jamenese in regard to the general question of border incidents along the entire frontier is not desirous at the present time of terminating the incident. In support of the last explanation it may be

pointed

pointed out that the lest paragraph of the Soviet communique on the conversation introduced an element heretofore not present in the Soviet demands, 'namely, that some general assurance will be sought from the Japanese against the recurrence of similar frontier incidents in the future.

Un to the present, at least from the published communiques of the Soviet Government and from other information evailable to the Embassy, there appears to be no, repeat no, evidence that the Soviet Government intends to recede from the position which it has maintained since the beginning of the controversy and there is an intimation in the request for a general assurance as indicated above that the Soviet Government may even be broadening its original position. In this way the Soviet Covernment, on the supposition that the Japanese do not intend to engage in a general war with the Soviet Union at the present time may be endeavoring to secure as complete a diplomatic victory as possible in the present instance and may be manifesting an uncompromising stitude in this controversy with a view to enhancing Soviet prestige in general throughout the world at this particular moment. As regards Litvinov's personal roll in the present controversy the consideration should not be excluded that the firm attifude which he has displayed may be motivated by a desire for the maximum of success with a view to enhancinghis own standing with the Kremlin and his personal reputation abroad.

KIRK

No. 9609

United States of America

DLFARTITET OF STATE

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I Certify That the document hereunto annexed is a true copy from the files of this Department.

In testimony whereof, I, CEORGE C. MARSWAIL,

Secretary of State, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Acting Authentication Officer of the said Department, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, this <u>twenty-third</u>
day of <u>January</u>, 1947.

/s/ George C. Marshall
Secretary of State.

By /s/ B. F. Cash
Acting Authentication Officer,
Department of State.

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大溪一样三个河南日一九三八年八月九日神 天堂 一九三八年八月九日神 张鼓孝幸中一貫、北河大院報告

(一人日本電子前工庫(

を見く説明して、はとうし、子は、うらきしい、してるり、が、し、子教林のは、けみめ人間、はり間、は、ころすべた、如子本、をでは、ころか、八月八月、公来、よろる、日本明らり、は、立場、「いいろうしの、日本軍ナント述、万後、日本例のは今天

(流行於(四))

Al Dre # 1551

Defence Doc # 1551.

現在这、所少了トモリグラ上上政府、公表及び大 使館二八十四人情報三日八八分十十一次府外論学 - 當初以来探ット来タ正場カラ引き下い音のヨットルヤ ら十灣樣、十八旦寺記一般的保庫,要求三分分 子」政府が其、富初、立場、指張サへこ下屋にコトが窺 くしたアラデアに、カクティダラとは成有い日本か目下り」 解那八一般的十群海了十十三十一月成了 天 富電事件一付出来得に少け外交上,大成功了 以外ヤラトン、旦特三个日コー時世界中二はいいかろ 工一一般回蘇了南人口的了以子本件論等三 非学術的能人不己于屋山、九王教以十个、本件論 、学言がけんりトゲイン個人、後割はなったとう 張硬十能凌いりしいりと當局一対スル氏自身一五 場及と国外一次下に佐個人、名声了南小に目的了以下最 大、成功の收×ヤラト、希望"甚りモーデマルカモ教しナイ 「かーの」

No. 3

国然省証明官建ビー、イー、キャッシュ(富名)国際長から、ショーシ、シー、マーシャル(四者名)

神様二余、姓名う記入也之又了同省、百印月石を上や上八二九四七年一月三十三百司三十二十百司三十二十百司三十二十百五十二十四年五日北京三十二十五十二年一日末城中三十四年十四十十十十十十五明天東正十四年十四十十二十十五明天余八前二流付セラレタル文書が生省、級ショリノ本大書「南久」

米合衆回回答省オルコッルラット

Sel & oc # 1551